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RECENT CASES
BankruptcyNON-EXEMPT LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES NOT
WITHIN § 70(d) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
An individual against whom an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was
filed concealed the existence of eight non-exempt life insurance policies.
After a receiver took possession of the greater portion of his non-exempt
property, he presented these policies to the insurance companies and executed loan agreements on the cash surrender values, falsely certifying that
no proceeding in bankruptcy was pending against him. A month later he
was adjudicated a bankrupt. The trustee learned of the policies and ascertained their cash surrender values from the companies as of the date that
the petition in bankruptcy was filed. The bankrupt was offered the opportunity to pay these amounts to the trustee and keep the policies in force
pursuant to § 70(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act.' After the bankrupt failed
to exercise this option, the trustee sued the insurance companies to recover
the full cash surrender values as of the date of the filing of the petition.
The court held that payment to the bankrupt in good faith and without
knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding was valid as against the trustee
since the bankrupt retained title to the policies until the option set forth
in § 70(a) (5) was exercised. Although § 70(d) 2 purports to set forth
all transfers protected as against the trustee, the court further held that
1. 30

STAT.

565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110(a)(5)

(1952): "...

And provided further, That when any bankrupt, who is a natural person, shall have

any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself, his estate,
or personal representatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender
value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same,
pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and continue to
hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating
in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the
policy shall pass to the trustee as assets. ..
"
2. "(d) After bankruptcy and either before adjudication or before a receiver
takes possession of the property of the bankrupt, whichever first occurs(1) A transfer of any of the property of the bankrupt . . . made to a person
acting in good faith shall be valid against the trustee if made for a present fair
equivalent value
(2) A person indebted to the bankrupt or holding property of the bankrupt may,
if acting in good faith, pay such indebtedness or deliver such property or any part
thereof, to the bankrupt or upon his order, with the same effect as if the bankruptcy
were not pending;
(3) A person having actual knowledge of such pending bankruptcy shall be
deemed not to act in good faith . . .
(4) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision shall not apply
where a receiver or trustee appointed by a United States or State court is in
possession of all or the greater portion of the non-exempt property of the bankrupt;
(5) . . . Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision . . . no transfer by
or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy shall be valid against the
trustee. .. ."
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this section did not govern life insurance policies. Lake v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 348 (D. Md. 1954).
Prior to the enactment of the 1938 Act,3 it generally was held that,
before adjudication, a transfer of the bankrupt's assets in good faith and
without knowledge by the transferee of the proceeding in bankruptcy was
protected as against the trustee. 4 These cases rested on § 70(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 5 which provided that the trustee was vested with
"title" as of the date of adjudication; therefore, the bankrupt could validly
transfer "title" until that date.

In Frederick v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins.

Co., 6 however, the Supreme Court upheld a payment to the beneficiary of
the deceased bankrupt's life insurance policy even after adjudication, the
insurance company having no knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding.
It may be concluded, therefore, that a good faith payment by a bankrupt's
debtor was protected under the Act of 1898. However, the Court had
also stated that "title" vested in the trustee at the date of the filing of the
petition; 6a thus, the situation was fraught with uncertainty since for other
purposes, such as protecting the general creditors against preferential attachments of the bankrupt's property subsequent to the filing of the petition, 7 the courts held that the bankrupt had no rights in his property. The
revisers of § 70 of the 1938 Act intended to clarify the situation.8 Section 70(a) was amended to provide that the bankrupt's title vested in the
trustee as of the date of the filing of the petition,9 and § 70(d) was added
to set forth specifically, without reference to title, those transfers of the
bankrupt's property which were protected as against the trustee.' 0 Section
70(d) (5) states that "except as otherwise provided in this subdivision
. no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy shall be valid as against the trustee. .. ."
In view of the clarity of subsection (5) and the legislative intent to
remove "title" as a basis for protecting transfers, it is difficult to accept
the instant court's conclusion that, since "title" was in the bankrupt, the
transfer of the cash surrender values of the policies is not governed by
§ 70(d). Assuming that § 70(d) properly should control this case, is this
transfer protected by its terms? The instant court proceeded on the theory
that § 70(d) (4) "1would deprive the transfer of protection since the greater
3. 52 STAT. 879 (1938).
4. 4 COLLmER, BANKRUPTCY 1329 (14th ed. 1942); Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1936) ; In re Zotti, 186 Fed. 84 (2d Cir. 1911) ; In re Chandler,
290 Fed. 988 (E.D. Pa. 1923); Stone v. Superior Fire Ins. Co., 278 Pa. 400, 123
AtI. 333 (1924); Note, 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 307 (1924).

5. 30 STAT. 565 (1898).
6. 256 U.S. 395 (1921).

6a. See 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 936-37 (14th ed. 1942).
7. See Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman, 222 U.S. 300 (1911). Cf. McLendon
v. Hyman, 37 Am. B.R. (N.s.) 438 (1938).
8. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1937); WEINSTEIN, TH
BANKRUPTCY LAw oF 1938, 160 (1938) ; Hearings before House Subcommittee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 211-12 (1937).
9. 52 STAT. 879, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1952).
10. Hearings before House Subcommittee m the Judiciary on HR. 6439, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 212 (1937).
11. See note 2 supra; instant case at 353.
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portion of the bankrupt's non-exempt property was in the possession of "a
receiver or trustee appointed by a United States or State court." But
textwriters indicate that § 70(d) (4) applies to a situation where a nonbankruptcy receiver or trustee has been appointed.' 2 Since the trustee
in the instant case was a bankruptcy trustee, the question of whether or
not this transfer is protected cannot be determined by § 70(d) (4). Attention should therefore be focused on the first sentence of § 70(d), for the
only transfers which are rendered valid by § 70(d) (1) and (2) are those
which occur either before adjudication or before a seceiver takes possession
"of the property" of the bankrupt, whichever occurs first. Since the
transfer in the instant case occurred before adjudication, only the second
limitation must be construed. The date of the appointment of the receiver
probably is not intended because the receiver is required to "take possession." 13 Nor is it likely that taking possession of only a small portion
of the property will suffice, for that would be practically limiting protection
to mere appointment of the receiver. The real problem is whether the
receiver must take possession of the particular property in question or of
the greater portion of the bankrupt's property in order to foreclose a valid
transfer of any of the property. Possession of the greater portion of the
property is the limitation set forth in § 70(d) (4), and several textwriters
have remarked that subsection (4) is analogous to the situation where a
bankruptcy receiver is appointed.' 4 But the fact that the phrase is used
explicitly in subsection (4) may imply that it would have been inserted
in the first sentence of § 70(d) were it intended. Furthermore, the literal
interpretation seems to point toward requiring possession of the particular
property. The history of the formulation of § 70(d) does not provide a
clear solution. The bill as introduced protected only those transfers made
before adjudication and "in the ordinary course of business." 15 Taking
the greater portion of the bankrupt's property would pass control of his
business to the receiver and, in effect, foreclose protection of any transfers.'
Before the bill was enacted, the phrase "takes possession of the property"
was substituted for "ordinary course of business," an alteration which extended protection to other than business assets, such as the life insurance
policies in the instant case. This change may indicate that the receiver
must take possession of the particular property, since taking the greater
portion of the bankrupt's property would not hamper the transfer of nonbusiness assets. Actual possession by the receiver also would be more likely
to put the bankrupt's debtor on notice of the bankruptcy; the present facts
12. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPrCY 1336 (14th ed. 1942); WEiNSTEIN, THE BANxRupTcY LAw OF 1938, 161 (1938).

13. See McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARv. L. REv.
The author, one of the chief revisers of the 1938 Act, originally
suggested for what later became § 70(d) that no transfer be protected after "qualification of the receiver."
14. See note 12 supra.
15. H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1926).
16. See In re Latex Drilling Co., 11 F.2d 373, 375 (W.D. La. 1926).

583, 615 (1927).
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illustrate that taking the majority of the property is not always notice of
bankruptcy. Thus, although the factors indicate that the trustee must take
possession of the particular property in order to avoid a good faith transfer,
the result is by no means dear. In the last analysis, construction of this
phrase probably will be based on balancing the purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act to preserve the bankrupt's estate for his creditors against unfairness
to good faith purchasers or debtors who deal with the bankrupt without
notice of the bankruptcy.17

CitizenshipNONRESIDENT NOT COVERED BY McCARRAN ACT
ENTITLED TO DETERMINATION OF CITIZENSHIP
UNDER DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
A twenty-four year old China resident, who never had been physically
present in the United States, was denied a passport on the ground that he
had failed to establish his citizenship. He then filed an action for a declaratory judgment to secure adjudication of his citizenship, which he claimed by
virtue of the citizenship of his father. On a motion to dismiss, the court
held that although the provisions for declaratory relief in § 360 of the
McCarran Act:' did not mention persons outside the United States, plaintiff
was not deprived of his right to maintain this action under the Declaratory
Judgment Act.2 Ton Mung Ngow v. Dulles, 122 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C.

1954).
The procedure under the Declaratory Judgment Act was first held
available to test the legality of a citizenship claim of one within the United
States in Perkins v. Elg, 1939.3 The Nationality Act of 19404 provided
expressly for the employment of this remedy by any person, regardless of
whether or not he was inside the United States, if he was denied a right
which he claimed as a national; it also permitted a person abroad, who had
instituted an action for a declaratory judgment, to obtain a certificate of
identity to enable him to enter this country for the purpose of litigating
his suit.5 Section 360 of the McCarran Act was passed in order to minimize
17. See McLaughlin, suPranote 13, at 615.

1. 66

STAT.

273, &U.S.C. § 1503 (1952).

2. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1952)

provides: "In a case of actual controversy within

its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights

and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought."

3. 307 U.S. 325, 349 (1939).
4. 54 STAT. 1137 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §§501-907 (1946).
5. 54 STAT. 1171 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §903 (1946).
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the number of actions for declaratory judgment 6 and also to prevent persons from asserting spurious claims in order to obtain entry with the hope
of evading deportation after their claims had been litigated unsuccessfully. 7
Section 360(a) affords the right to bring an action for declaratory judgment to those persons who are within the country and who claim denial of a
right as a United States national. 8 Section 360(b) provides that persons
who are not within the United States may obtain a certificate of identity in
order to travel to a port of entry and apply for admission, 9 but the language
of this section mentions only those persons who at some time have been
present physically in the United States, or are under sixteen years of age
and were born abroad of a United States citizen parent.' 0 However, the
McCarran Act does not deny explicitly the right of persons who never
have been physically present and are over sixteen years of age to declaratory
judgments, and it was this congressional failure which the instant court
utilized to grant relief. 1 '
Between 1940 and the passage of the McCarran Act, the question of
whether the Declaratory Judgment Act was available independently to
determine claims of citizenship did not arise, because the Nationality Act
of 1940 expanded the availability of declaratory judgments.12 This question
is important under the present state of the law because, if Congress
6. SEN. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1952); SEN. REP. No. 1515,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 810 (1950); 98 CoNG. REc. 5611 (1952); Joint Hearings before

Subcommittee of the Committees on thw Judiciary on S. 716, H. R. 2379, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 108 (1951). See the discussion of the large backlog of cases in Ly Shew
v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 50, 54, 55 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
7. Joint Hearings, supra note 6, at 106-10.
8. 66 STAT. 273, 8 U.S.C. §1503(a) (1952).
9. 66 STAT. 273, 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b) (1952). Upon arrival at a port of entry
the applicant is subject to all the regulations of the Immigration Service involving
aliens seeking admission; and a final determination by the Attorney General is
subject to review only in habeas corpus proceedings. 66 STAT. 273, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1503(c) (1952). See also 22 CODE FED. REAS. § 50.32 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
10. 66 STAT. 273, 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b) (1952). Plaintiff was deprived of any
effective remedy. It is impossible for him to reach a port of entry since it is unlawful for a transportation company to bring to the country anyone not in possession
of a valid travel document. 66 STAT. 227, 8 U.S.C. § 1323 (1952).
11. The court leaned heavily in support of its decision on the Administrative
Procedure Act and its legislative history. It placed particular emphasis on § 10(b)
which expressly authorizes use of declaratory judgments, and on § 12 which provides
that "No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions
of this chapter except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly."
However, since the issuance of passports always has been regarded as discretionary,
it is within the exception of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which excludes from the operation of that section agency action which is "by law committed
to agency discretion."
Although Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C.
1952), held that the constitutionality of the Passport Act, 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22
U.S.C. §211(a) (1952), could be upheld only by reading that statute as requiring
a hearing upon the denial or alteration of a passport, the regulations promulgated
as a result of that decision apply only to cases involving national security. 22 CODE
FED. REas. §§ 51.135-.143 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
12. See text at note 5 supra. The Nationality Act also permitted suit to be
brought in the district where the applicant claimed residence rather than only
in the district court of the District of Columbia as had been theretofore required.
54 STAT. 1171 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 903 (1946).
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absorbed this portion of the Declaratory Judgment Act when it passed the
1940 Act, then any subsequent legislation on the subject of citizenship
which modifies the 1940 Act also must modify the Declaratory Judgment
Act. It may be argued that the Declaratory Judgment Act was not
abrogated because the 1940 Act broadened the existing remedy and, also,
because the McCarran Act seems to have been directed only at the problems
raised by the 1940 Act. Moreover, although Perkins v'. Eg is not precedent for a claim of citizenship by a person outside the country, the nature
of the Declaratory Judgment Act is no bar because that Act merely requires
an actual controversy, and a controversy on the subject of citizenship can
arise abroad as well as in this country. The determination of these claims
is not subject to insuperable administrative difficulties, as illustrated by
the procedure for such claims established under the 1940 Act. Furthermore, a declaratory judgment has been employed by a person abroad to
obtain judicial settlement of another matter.13 However, these arguments
are nullified by the clear congressional intent in the McCarran Act to
restrict the use of declaratory judgments solely to persons within the
country; therefore, any interpretation to the contrary is unsound.
Had the court accorded the legislation its intended effect, a constitutional problem would have arisen, and perhaps it was the court's reluctance
to meet this issue that led to its strained interpretation of the statute. The
effect of § 360 of the McCarran Act ordinarily is to deprive an individual
of any opportunity for an administrative or judicial hearing.' 4 Several
cases stand for the proposition that if a person seeking admission claims
citizenship and is granted a hearing, that hearing must conform to the
requisites of due process.15 Since the courts in these cases emphasized the
importance of a claim of citizenship in deciding whether a fair hearing had
been received, it is conceivable that due process also requires that a
hearing be granted. The right of a citizen to enter the United States: 6
would be hollow if a person claiming citizenship was not given the chance
to prove his allegation. 17 On the other hand, to require the consulates
throughout the world to conduct a hearing whenever a claim of citizenship
is made would be impractical since they are not equipped to do so. Moreover, an argument may be made that Congress, by requiring persons such
13. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952) (determination of right
to a hearing upon alteration of passport).
14. In this case, since the denial of the right claimed as a United States national
occurred as the result of an application for a passport, the applicant was entitled to
a hearing under 22 CoDa FED. REGs. §§ 51.138-.139 (Cum. Supp. 1952). However,
the question of citizenship may arise in other situations, e.g., application as a United
States national for registration at an American consulate or for non-quota status
of an alien wife or minor child.
15. Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U.S. 352 (1926) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White,
253 U.S. 454 (1920); Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (1912); Chin Yow v.
United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1907) ; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905);
United States eo rel. Medeiros v. Watkins, 166 F2d 897 (2d Cir. 1948).
16. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1907) ; cf. Mao v. Brownell, 207
F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1953); see Comment, 61 YALz L.J. 171, 189-91 (1952).
17. See Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 9 (1907).
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as plaintiff to come to this country by the age of sixteen, has done no more
than denominate another act which, if omitted, results in expatriation.
While such an interpretation of § 360 appears to be inconsistent with
specific provisions of the McCarran Act, such as the ability of persons living
in a foreign state of which they are a national to assert a claim to United
8
States citizenship within three years after attaining the age of twenty-two,'
the principle remains that loss of nationality may result constitutionally
from extended residence abroad.' 9 In any event, whatever the ultimate
conclusion as to constitutionality, the instant court should have dealt with
this problem.

Internal RevenueRENTAL AGENCY MAY RECOVER FORFEITED,

VEHICLE DESPITE FAILURE TO INQUIRE
INTO CUSTOMER'S RECORD
Claimant, operator of a U-Drive-It business, was unaware that a customer to whom he rented a truck possessed a criminal record for liquor law
violations. The vehicle was seized by federal agents while being used to
transport illegal liquor and subsequently was forfeited.' In an action for
the return of the truck, the district court denied relief because of claimant's
failure to comply with § 3617(b) (3) of the remission statute,2 which requires inquiry by "any claimant" into a customer's record and reputation
for liquor law violations. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
inquiry requirement is not applicable to rental agencies because it was intended to include only those transactions in which credit inquiries normally
are made. Harrisv. United States, 215 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1954).
Prior to the present statute, the Secretary of the Treasury was empowered to remit forfeitures which were incurred by a claimant "without
18. 66 STAT. 269, 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1952) ; 66 STAT. 269, 8 U.S.C. § 1483 (1952).
19. United States v. Howe, 231 Fed. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3615 (1952).
2. 18 U.S.C. §3617(b) (1952) provides:
"Conditions precedent to remission or mitigation.
"In any such proceeding the court shall not allow the claim of any claimant
for remission or mitigation . . . (3) if it appears that the interest asserted by the
claimant arises out of or is in any way subject to any contract or agreement under
which any person having a record or reputation for violating laws of the United

States or of any State relating to liquor has a right with repect to such vehicle . . .
[unless and until the claimant proves] that, before . . . such other person acquired
his right under such contract or agreement, . . . the claimant . . . was informed
in answer to his inquiry, at the headquarters of the sheriff, chief of police, principal

Federal internal-revenue officer engaged in the enforcement of the liquor laws, or
other principal local or Federal law-enforcement officer of the locality in which such
other person acquired his right under such contract or agreement, of the locality
in which such other person then resided, and of each locality in which the claimant
has made any other inquiry as to the character or financial standing of such other
person, that such other person had no such record or reputation."
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willful negligence or . . . intention . . . to defraud the revenue or to
," 8 In the administration of this provision, the
violate the law ....
Treasury Department required claimants who normally made credit inquiries to show that a "bootleg hazard" investigation had been conducted. 4
The present statute, which grants sole power of remission to the courts,6
requires "any claimant" who leases a vehicle under "any contract or agreement" to determine if the customer possessed a record or reputation for
liquor law violation. Inquiry must be made of designated law enforcement
officials at the place where the proposed contract will be entered into, in
the locality in which the customer resides, and in each locality where the
lessor has made "any other inquiry as to . . . financial standing. .... "
"Any other" implies that the "bootleg" investigation is related to credit
inquiry, and this reading of the statute is strengthened by the fact that the
place of the contract and residence of the lessee are the normal localities for
credit inquiries. This emphasis on credit is also found in the legislative
history, which discusses "any claimant" and "any contract or agreement"
in terms of "credit inquiries" and "credit risks." 6 Evidently, Congress
considered only the most common transactions where inquiry is madefinancing of vehicles by conditional sales and chattel mortgages, or long
term leases-and not vehicle-rental agencies, which were of minor importance in 1935,7 when the present statute was enacted. Although congressional intent is doubtful, courts, prior to the instant case, have assumed
that short term leases by rental agencies are within the statutory language
"any claimant" and "any contract or agreement" 8 without considering
whether the Treasury Department's limitation, that liquor inquiries were
required only from those who customarily inquired about credit, was implicit
in the present statute. However, courts have tended to decrease the
severity of the statute by rejecting literal interpretations in two situations:
has been held not to be a "claimant" who makes an
a gratuitous bailor
"agreement"; 9 and a claimant's proof of inquiry to fulfill the "conditions
precedent to remission" is required only after the Government proves that
3. 45 STAT. 882 (1928), 26 U.S.C. § 1626 (1934), which made 42 STAT. 987
(1922), 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1934), applicable to forfeitures under the Internal Revenue

Laws.

4. Hearing before the Committee o the Judiciary o Sen. 3336, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13 (1935).
5. 18 U.S.C. §3617(a) (1952).
6. Hearing, supra note 4, at 13; H.R. REP. No. 1601, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6,

7 (1935).

7. The rental industry's major development was during World War II. Rental
Profile, TAxIcAB INDusTRY Auto RENTAL NEws 21, 34 (March, 1953).
8. Pittsburgh Parking Garages, Inc. v. United States, 108 F.2d 35 (3d Cir.
1939), sub noin., United States v. Ford Truck, 115 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1940) (short
term lease by implication); United States v. One 1950-1951 Ford Van Type One and
One-Half Ton Truck, 118 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Va. 1954); United States v. One
1936 Studebaker Sedan, 21 F. Supp. 499 (W.D. Wash. 1937).
9. United States v. One 1946 Mercury Sedan Automobile, 100 F. Supp. 957
(N.D. Ga. 1951), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Frank Graham Co., 199 F.2d 499

(5th Cir. 1952).
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inquiry of the designated officials would have furnished notice to claimant
of its customer's record or reputation.' 0
Forfeiture is designed to deprive an owner of his car if he employs
it in violation of law, and to discourage third parties from providing a
vehicle; 11 innocent claimants are protected from loss through the operation
of the remission provisions.12 Forfeiture of rental agency vehicles will
exert no direct pressure on a violator, except for the slight possibility that an
agency may recover from the violator for the loss of its vehicle; 13 but, if
inquiries are made, a large source of vehicles may be withheld from known
violators. Failure to require inquiry could decrease materially cooperation
between agencies and law enforcement officials. A rental agency of dubious
integrity would be eligible for reniission by proving it had no knowledge
or reason to know that its customer would use the vehicle to violate liquor
laws, although it is still within a court's power to withhold remission if
the circumstances indicate bad faith. 14 On the other hand, the burden of
inquiry may prove too great for many agencies, particularly those of small
size. Agencies normally make credit inquiries for long-term bailments,
which are a large percentage of their business, 15 but the desire for fast
service has fostered the custom of nominal investigations for short-term
bailments. Both the Internal Revenue Service and the police require that
requests for information be made in writing.16 Even if an agent were used
to facilitate the gathering of reports, there still would be difficulty in procuring information at night time, on holidays, and other off hours. Also,
a customer with a distant residence would be unable to obtain a car quickly,
unless advance preparation had been made. One court has held that a
current card file, maintained by the agency and containing information on
liquor violators, satisfies the inquiry requirement.' 7 Such a file might be a
reasonable requirement for large agencies, and sufficient to meet the statute
even though the letter of the law in an "inquiry, at the [law enforcement]
headquarters" is not fulfilled, but a file could be an unreasonable burden
on a small agency, as in the instant case. A centralized bureau in metropolitan areas might be established to furnish such information to individual
agencies which seek it by telephone, but this imposes a heavy expense on
agencies at a distance from large cities. The problem of the small agency,
distant from a metropolitan area, remains unsolved. If it is desirable to
place an affirmative duty of inquiry on rental agencies, the present statute
10. United States v. Ford Truck, 115 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1940).
11. See Note, 27 NorE DAE LAw. 433 (1952).
12. See United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 DeLuxe Coach, 307 U.S.
219, 226 (1939).
13. The bailee contracts that he will not use the vehicle to transport illegal
liquor. U-Drive-It Bailment Contract.
14. See C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 89 F.2d 977, 978 (4th Cir. 1937).
15. A RENTAL AUTOMOBILE SURVEY 8 (Defense Transport Adm. 1953).
16. Information acquired by interview with local Internal Revenue and police
officials.
17. United States v. One 1950-1951 Ford Van Type One and One-Half Ton
Truck, 118 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Va. 1954).
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should be amended to state a feasible plan; for if the imposition of forfeiture on agencies does not encourage them to make inquiry but merely
forces them to accept loss as a risk of the business, forfeiture does not
accomplish its purpose of the prevention of crime, but results in a penalty
for the privilege of doing business. On this basis, the court in the instant
case reached the correct conclusion.

Labor LawLOUISIANA "LITTLE NORRIS-LaGUARDIA
ACT" DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A strike-bound employer sought an immediate restraining order and
temporary injunction against the acts of 21 picketing employees, averring a
continuing trespass upon company property and threats of bodily harm to
other employees, and attributing to the defendants acts of violence committed by unknown persons. These alleged acts of violence and intimidation were sporadic in nature and the latest acts preceded the filing of the
petition by nearly one month. The district court granted an immediate
restraining order without notice to the defendants, as permitted by the
state's general injunction statute.' In the subsequent hearing, another
district court judge utilized the "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" and dismissed the employer's petition for failure to allege sufficient acts of violence 2
within the requirements of that act 3 The Supreme Court of Louisiana,
on direct appeal, reversed and remanded for trial on the merits, holding
that those procedural provisions of the Louisiana "Little Norris-LaGuardia
Act" which restrict the court's power to grant immediate relief in labor
disputes violated the due process clause and infringed the constitutionally
defined jurisdiction of equity. The court also held that proof of the company's allegations would entitle it to a preliminary injunction. Douglas
Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard,225 La. 972, 74 So.2d 182 (1954).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,- the first effective legislation
5
curbing the abuse of ex parte injunctions in labor disputes, denied the
federal courts jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes except to
prevent irreparable injury to property rights from violence or fraud and,
even in those cases, imposed strict procedural requirements before issuance.
The Act was construed to affect only the remedy rather than the substan1. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4061-71 (1950).
2. The district court refused a motion to amend the petition to include an allegation of mass picketing and further threats and violence which had occurred on the
day of the hearing. Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, No. 31841, 24th Jud.
Dist., Jefferson Parish, Ld., April 23, 1954.
3. LA. Ray. STAT. Am. §§ 23:841-49 (1950).
4. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952).
5. The situation prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act is discussed thoroughly in
& GREENE, THE LABor INJUNcrI N (1930).
-rEuiRi
FaANs

566

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[VoL 103

five rights of employers, 6 and was sustained as a valid exercise of Congressional power to "ordain and establish" jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts. 7 Several states enacted legislation similar to the NorrisLaGuardia Acts and, although some courts interpreted the statutes narrowly, 9 only a few nullified them completely. Several grounds have been
advanced for the invalidity of the state acts. First, in early advisory opinions two courts concluded that the proscription of injunctive relief deprived
the employer of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment since
However, this objecit was based upon an unreasonable classification.1
tion was rejected by the Supreme Court in Senn v. Tile Layers Union,"
and one of the above states subsequently enacted a "Little Norris-LaGuardia2
Act" which was upheld without mention of the prior advisory decision.1
The second basis for attacking the anti-injunction acts in state courts was
that the detailed procedural requirements abridged equity's inherent power
to grant injunctive relief. The acts provide that no temporary or permanent injunction shall issue in any labor dispute until the judge, after
hearing testimony in open court with full opportunity for cross-examination
of witnesses, has made various findings of fact; temporary restraining
orders may be granted immediately 13 if proof of the petitioner's claim
would entitle him to a preliminary injunction. This objection is invalid
where the legislature is given authority to establish and define the court's
equitable powers, and in these states the anti-injunction statutes have been
sustained as declaratory of existing substantive law,14 affecting only the
jurisdiction and procedure of equity.' 5 In several states equity jurisdiction is created by the state constitution; this poses a more acute problem,
but the statutes usually have been upheld as reasonable procedural regu6. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 595 (1934).
7. U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, §§ 1, 2; for a criticism of this interpretation, see
Crothers, The Anti-Injunction Acts and Our State Constitutions, 21 ORE. L. REv.
63 (1941).
8. As of 1947 twenty states had enacted similar legislation. See 2 Tu.aa,
LABOR DisPUTs AND CoLucivE BARGAINING § 434 (Supp. 1947).
9. The various methods utilized by the courts to restrict the application of the
acts are set forth in Tu.aR, id. chapter 20. See also Note, 46 YAM L.J. 1064
(1937) ; 46 Coi L. Rxv. 860 (1947).
10. In re Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176 N.E. 649 (1931); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 86 N.H. 597, 166 At. 640 (1933).
11. 301 U.S. 468 (1937) (sustaining the Wisconsin "Little Norris-LaGuardia
Act") ; see also Starr v. Laundry Workers' Union, 155 Ore. 634, 63 P.2d 1104
(1936).
12. Simon v. Schwachman, 301 Mass. 573, 18 N.E.2d 1 (1938).
13. But see text at note 28, infra.
14. E.g., Remington Rand v. Crofoot, 248 App. Div. 356, 289 N.Y. Supp. 1025
(4th Dep't), aff'd without opinion, 279 N.Y. 635, 18 N.E.2d 37 (1936); Starr v.
Laundry Workers' Union, 155 Ore. 634, 63 P.2d 1104 (1936).
15. E.g., E. M. Loew's Enterprises v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees, 127 Conn. 415, 17 A.2d 525 (1941) ; Fashioncraft v. Halpern, 313 Mass.
385, 48 N.E.2d 1 (1943); Lipoff v. United Food Workers, 33 Pa. D. & C. 599
(Philadelphia C.P. 1938).
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lations for,'0 or as changes of the substantive law in,1 7 labor disputes. Prior
to the instant decision, only two states held that the anti-injunction acts
were an illegal attempt by the legislature to abridge the courts' constitutionally defined powers.18 The first decision under the Louisiana statute 19
adopted the interpretation given to the Federal Act, but the court failed to
consider the effect of the state constitution. In the recent case of Tsiggs
v. Journeyman Barbers Union, AFL,2 0 however, an intermediate Louisiana
court held that the "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" could not deprive the
district court of its constitutional power 2 ' to grant injunctive relief. The
Louisiana Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the Twiggs decision
22
and, in the present case, adopted its rationale.
There appears to be no judicial precedent in Louisiana compelling the
instant court's conclusion, since other statutes, which also infringe upon
the court's power to grant injunctive relief, have been sustained over the
same argument.P A factor in this decision may have been that legislative
restriction of injunctions has greater social significance when labor disputes are involved than in the areas of tax collection or expenditure of
public funds. Although it is possible that Louisiana courts will continue
to apply at least the policy of the anti-injunction statute, as has occurred
in Washington, 24 the present holding also would allow a return to the
abuses of ex parte injunctions unless the court is prepared, of its own
accord, to balance realistically the equities of an employer's right to protect
his property against the right of employees to concerted action.
The instant court also held that the procedural requirements of the
anti-injunction act infringe upon a court's duty to protect constitutional
16. E.g., Isolantite, Inc. v. United Electrical Workers, CIO, 132 NJ. Eq. 613,
29 A.2d 183 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942) (New Jersey later reversed this position; see
note 18 infra).
17. E.g., Denver Local 13, Teamsters Union, AFL v. Perry Truck Lines, 106
Colo. 25, 101 P.2d 436 (1940) ; American Furniture Co. v. Teamsters Union, AFL,
222 Wis. 338, 268 N.W. 250 (1936).
18. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936);
Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, CIO, 138 N.J.
Eq. 3, 46 A.2d 453 (Ch. 1946) (partial invalidity). The New Jersey statute was
amended, and later sustained in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical
Workers, CIO, 139 N.J. Eq. 97, 49 A.2d 896 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946).
19. Dehan v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, AFL, 159 So. 637 (La.
App. 1935).
20. 58 So.2d 298 (La. App.), cert. denied, No. 19893 (July 3, 1952).
21. LA. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 35 vests the district courts with "original jurisdiction
in all civil matters." Section 2 provides that "each district judge may issue . . .
writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and all other needful writs,
orders and process. ...."

22. 225 La. at 984, 74 So.2d at 186.
23. E.g., Wall v. Close, 201 La. 986, 10 So.2d 779 (1942), construing LA. Ray.
STAT. ANN. § 13:4061 (1950) (prohibiting temporary restraining orders to enjoin
the expenditure of public funds).
24. Subsequent decisions in Washington apparently have continued to apply the
statute: City of Yakima v. Gorham, 200 Wash. 564, 94 P.2d 180 (1939) (antipicketing ordinance invalidated because of conflict with policy of state anti-injunction
act) ; Berger v. Sailors Union, 29 Wash.2d 810, 189 P.2d 473 (1948) (anti-injunction
statute utilized to determine existence of "labor dispute") ; Ostroff v. Laundry
Drivers Union, AFL, 37 Wash.2d 595, 606, 225 P.2d 419, 425 (1950).
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rights of due process and administer justice without denial or delay. The
majority opinion recognized the doctrine that the legislature may prescribe
the procedure by which constitutional rights are maintained, but held that
the "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" restricted invalidly the judicial power
to grant immediate injunctive relief when that relief was necessary to
protect an employer's property rights. The court underscored the necessity of a full hearing prior to the issuance of a temporary or permanent
injunction, 25 but this requirement is common in anti-injunction acts and
has been upheld over the due process objection in other states. 28 Since
the employer's remedy is not abolished, but merely regulated, it is difficult
to support the court's objection to these provisions. The rationale of most
courts in which equity is constitutionally created, that the prerequisites of
hearing and detailed findings are not unreasonable in preserving the status
quo of both parties, seems to be the better reasoned view. However, the
Louisiana statute contains the further restriction, found in only four other
states,27 that 48 hours notice is required before the issuance of even a
temporary restraining order.2 s Although the original purpose of this requirement was to afford labor the greatest possible protection from injunctive abuse,2 9 the temporary denial of any adequate remedy appears to
violate the employer's right to protect his property. 0 The notice requirement did not effect a hardship in the present case, however, because the
employer did not file his petition until one month after the alleged acts
of violence occurred. Under the Federal Act, when an employer has had
ample time to comply with the conditions of the statute and has failed to
do so, injunctive relief has been denied even though violence is involved. 81
The instant court's failure to indicate clearly the specific procedural provision which it invalidated leaves doubtful the extent to which the Louisiana
legislature may regulate in the area of labor relations. As indicated by the
dissenting and concurring opinions,32 the court was not compelled to decide
the anti-injunction act's constitutionality. The court held that the employer was entitled to relief under the terms of the act 3 and could have
reversed the decision solely on the basis of the trial judge's abuse of discretion in dismissing the employer's petition.
25. 225 La. at 983, 74 So.2d at 186.
26. E.g., George B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n of Mechanics, AFL, 155
Ore. 652, 63 P.2d 1090 (1936) ; Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers Int'l Union, 358 Ill. 239,
193 N.E. 112 (1934).
27. IDAHO CODE ANN. §44-706 (1948) (enacted 1933); MD. ANN. CODE GEN.
LAws art. 100, § 68(h) (1951) (enacted 1935) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-1-28 (1953)
(enacted 1933) ; Wis. STAT. § 103.56(2) (1953) (enacted 1931). The validity of these
provisions does not appear to have been litigated although the Wisconsin statute was
sustained over due process objections in Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468
(1937).
28. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:844 (1950).
29. FRAati TER & GREENE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 224.
30. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
31. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50
(1944).
32. 225 La. at 989, 74 So.2d at 188.
33. 225 La. at 987, 74 So.2d at 187.
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Unfair Trade-COURT REJECTS CONTENTION THAT SALE OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUG AFTER REMOVAL OF
TRADE NAME IS EXEMPT FROM
FAIR TRADE STATUTE
Defendant, a retailer, previously had been enjoined from selling the
products of plaintiff, a drug manufacturer, below the minimum fair trade
prices established by plaintiff's contracts with other retailers' in accordance with the Louisiana Fair Trade Law2 In filling prescriptions, defendant removed plaintiff's drugs from bulk containers bearing trade names,
and sold them below the minimum prices in containers bearing prescription
labels. In one instance, the defendant sold a drug in the original package after replacing the trade name with a prescription label. In an action
for contempt, the court held that the specificity provisions of FED. R. Civ. P.
65(d) 3 require incorporation of the minimum prices in the injunctive
decree, and that reference to the prevailing fair trade contracts is not
sufficient. The court dismissed the action with leave to the plaintiff to
amend the decree. The court also rejected the defendant's contention that
he had avoided a fair trade violation by removing the plaintiff's trademark
from the containers sold. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Schwegmann Bros.
Giant Super Markets, 122 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1954).
The general practice in cases of fair trade violations seems to be to
issue injunctions similar to the one involved here, and this decision is the
first to hold such an injunction unenforceable for lack of specificity. 4 There

was no indication in the opinion that plaintiff had altered its prices since
issuance of the original decree; so long as there are no price changes
subsequent to an original decree, the requirement that prices be specified
would not hinder enforcement. However, the court's interpretation of
Rule 65 (d) would seem to require an amendment to include each subsequent price change. It is unlikely that the manufacturer would be burdened
1. The Louisiana statute contains a "non-signer" provision.

LA. Rnv. STAT.

§51:394 (1950).
2. "No contract, relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or
the label or container of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer of the commodity and which is in fair and open competition with commodities
of the same general class produced by others, shall violate any law of this state by
reason of any of the following provisions which may be contained in the contract:
(1) That the vendee shall not resell the commodity at less than the minimum price
stipulated by the vendor; (2) That the vendee or producer require in delivery to
whom he may resell the commodity, an agreement that the second vendee will not,
in turn, resell at less than the minimum price stipulated by the vendor or by the
vendee." LA. REv. STAT. § 51:392 (1950).
3. "Every order granting an injunction . . . shall be specific in terms; shall
describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts . . . to be restrained. ...
"
4. Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (enforcing, in a contempt proceeding, the identical form of injunction held unenforceable in
the instant case). But see, Iowa Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. May's Drug Stores, Inc.,
229 Iowa 554, 565-66, 294 N.W. 756, 762 (1940) (injunction limited to fair trade
contracts referred to in petition and established at trial).
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with the necessity of a formaf appearance in order to amend; but even to
permit amendment by less formal means, such as notice to the court by
registered mail, would impose a clerical burden on court personnel and
seems unnecessary to achieve the primary aim of giving notice to the retailer. Adequate notice could be assured by requiring that before punishment for contempt the manufacturer prove, as he must to secure the original
injunction, that the retailer had notice of the prevailing prices. Nevertheless, a literal reading of Rule 65(d) seems to require that new prices be
substituted in the decree.
The more interesting aspect of the instant case is that which relates
to the sale of drugs at less than minimum price after removal of the trade
name. The Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of a state
fair trade law in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers
Corp.,0 added by way of dictum that: "There is nothing in the act to
preclude the purchaser from removing the mark or brand from the commodity-thus separating the physical property, which he owns, from the
good-will, which is the property of another-and then selling the commodity
at his own price, provided he can do so without utilizing the good-will of
the latter as an aid to that end." 7 The statutes of sixteen states exempt a
sale when the trademark is removed and not referred to directly or indirectly in consummating the sale,8 but the Louisiana statute has no such
provision. 9 This presents, apparently for the first time,10 the question
whether practices such as those of the retailer in the instant case constitute
utilization of the good will of the producer to accomplish the sale of a
prescription drug. The manufacturer's market for these drugs is essentially the physician, since the choice as to both the type and brand of drug
to be prescribed rests with him and since a pharmacist is required by law
to employ only the specified items in filling the prescription. In view of
this, Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories11 held
irrelevant, for purposes of determining trademark infringement, the understanding of the general public as to whether plaintiff's trademark indicated
a particular brand or, instead, the product itself generically. The understanding of physicians properly was held determinative. The instant court
5. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342, 346,
2 N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Downs v. Benatar's Cut Rate Drug Stores,
75 Cal. App. 2d 61, 67, 170 P.2d 88, 92 (1946).
6. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
7. Id. at 195.
8. A listing of the states with such exemptions may be found in 1 CCH
TRADE REG. RaP. (10th ed.) §3006 (1954).
A typical exemption is: "When the
trademark, brand or name is removed or wholly obliterated . . . and is not used
or directly or indirectly referred to in the advertisement or sale thereof;" N.C.
GEN. STAT. §66-55(b) (1950).
9. LA. REv. STAT. §51:39310. See 1 CCH TRADE REG.

(1950).

REP. (10th ed.) §3236 (1954). But see Pinesbridge
Farm, Inc. v. Bloomingdale Bros., Inc., 176 Misc. 179, 26 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct.
1941).
11. 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953), 102 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 419 (1954) (especially
the discussion of the three party nature of the sale). See Bayer Co. v. United Drug
Co., 272 Fed. 505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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stated that awareness by the consumer of the name of the drug in his
prescription is not essential to a finding that the trade name of the manufacturer was utilized in selling a fair-traded product.' 2 Although the
decision in Ross-Whitney, on which the court apparently relied, is not in
itself authority for this proposition, the same unique aspect of the prescription drug field-the controlling position of physicians in the chain of distribution-also is important in the present case. The influential role of
doctors provides a basis for the court's conclusion, unexplained in the opinion, that the good will established in the drug trademarks "is inseparably
bound with prescriptions which physicians write for their patients." 13
Whether a doctor will prescribe plaintiff's drug depends upon the former's
opinion of the product. Recognizing this, producers of drugs pursue a
course of direct advertising to the medical profession in order to convince
them of the desirable qualities of the advertised product and to create good
will. 4 Since the ultimate sale at the druggist's level is dependent upon
prescription by a doctor, the druggist is, in effect, utilizing the good will
created by the producer with the physician as an aid to the sale.
However, while this analysis establishes a technical utilization to secure
the sale of a particular brand, it does not establish that a particular druggist
uses the good will of the producer to secure the patronage of the public
for himself. Naturally, this latter constitutes the primary aim of a pricecutting retailer and the matter of principal concern to the fair trade adherents among his competitors. Although it need not be proved as a distinct element of a fair trade offense that the seller's price-cutting practices
induced the patronage of the customers involved, this question is relevant
when any finding of a violation must be based on highly theoretical analysis
and a non-literal reading of the statutory terms limiting fair trade enforcement to a "commodity which bears, or the label or container of which
bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer. . . ." Il Nevertheless, even on the question of patronage, there is support for the instant
court's conclusion in terms of the probable impact upon the business of
competing distributors, who are considered by many the true impelling force
behind, and the primary beneficiaries of, enactment and enforcement of fair
trade statutes.' 6 If a retailer advertises that he sells all or most prescription drugs below fair trade prices,' 7 he is likely to achieve substantial in12. Instant case at 787.
13. Ibid.
14. In 1953 Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. spent some $4,500,000 in such advertising.

Instant case at 783.

15. See note 2 supra. "It is not essential, under such circumstances, that the
product or container physically bear the trade-mark, label, brand or name of the
manufacturer at the moment of delivery." Instant case at 788.
16. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 109 F. Supp.
269, 272 (E.D. La. 1953); FTC, RmEORT oN RESALE PRicE MAINTErANcE LIV
(1945); Schachtman, Resale Price Maintenance and the Fair Trade Laws, 11 U.

Pr. L. REv. 562, 578-79 (1950).
17. Schwegmann Bros. advertised extensively that they were selling numerous
fair trade articles below the established minimum prices. Instant case at 786.
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direct benefit even without reference to any specific trade names. The customer will know that he can obtain from the retailer the precise product
which he wants, namely, the type of drug recommended by the physician,
upon whom patients normally rely without inquiry into the identity of
the producer. And customers, knowing the retailer's price policy, will tend
to patronize him in the expectation that the prescribed drug is, or probably
will be, among those on which the retailer offers a saving. Prevention of
injury to competing distributors, however, is not the basis on which the
constitutionality of fair trade restrictions on a retailer's prices has been
upheld. The Supreme Court relied expressly in Old Dearbornon protection of producers' interest in the intangible property of good will as the
core of the constitutional justification for fair trade.' 8 It is not at all clear
that the tactics of the retailer in the instant case pose a serious threat of
injury to producers' good will. Physicians are not likely to be disturbed
by the sale of a product below fair trade price, so long as they remain
confident of its quality. Furthermore, retailers maintaining fair trade
prices, who sometimes withdraw from sale the merchandise of a producer
which is being featured by cut-rate stores, may be quite reluctant to do so
in the case of prescription drugs where failure to supply customers probably
will create an unfavorable impression, especially when the customer's need
is relatively urgent. On the other hand, it has been stated that manufacturers lose $50,000,000 a year from substitution by retailers, with doctors'
permission, of one prescription drug for another.' 9
The instant opinion, while emphasizing the peculiar element of
anonymity of trade name in consumer sales of prescription drugs, does not
examine or even articulate its practical significance in terms of retailer
strategy and probability of injury to producer's good will. The court's
conclusion should not be adopted in future decision without careful investigation of these factors.
18. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183,
193 (1936). For a discussion that such is not the purpose of fair trade laws at the
present time, see Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. oF CHI. L. Rnv. 175, 206-11
(1954); Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 381 (1952); Note, 63 YALE L.J. 538 (1954).
19. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1954, p. 53, col. 1.

